International — Region / International — Region

Yemeni government forces retake Hadhramaut and al-Mahra from the STC

Saudi-backed Yemeni forces recaptured Hadhramaut and al-Mahra governorates on 4 January 2026 after a two-day operation against the Southern Transitional Council.

Dense cluster of tall mud-brick tower houses rising above an arid plain in the historic city of Shibam, Wadi Hadhramaut
ARCHIVAL CONTEXT Mud-brick tower houses in Shibam, a UNESCO World Heritage site in Wadi Hadhramaut, photographed in September 1999. The image identifies the wider region where the 4 January 2026 fighting occurred; it does not depict the recapture. Photo: Jialiang Gao, CC BY-SA 3.0. Downloaded without modification; cropped responsively in the page layout.

What happened on 4 January

Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces recaptured the governorates of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra from the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council on 4 January 2026, ending a two-day operation that reversed the STC’s late-2025 seizure of the two provinces. Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council, said in a statement on Saturday that the Saudi-backed “Homeland Shield” forces had achieved “record success” in retaking all military and security positions in the provinces bordering Saudi Arabia after the operation launched a day earlier.

The recapture reverses a December 2025 offensive in which the STC, a member of the anti-Houthi coalition, had seized the two governorates — together nearly half of Yemen’s territory and both sharing a long border with Saudi Arabia. The two-day counter-offensive that began on 3 January was accompanied by Saudi airstrikes on STC positions, including a raid on a camp at Al-Khashaa in Wadi Hadhramaut that STC officials said killed 20 people. Government sources told Al Jazeera Arabic on Sunday that Yemeni forces had taken control of all districts of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest governorate, and the director-general of al-Mahra’s youth office told Anadolu Agency that Homeland Shield forces had taken control of all nine districts of al-Mahra following the withdrawal of STC forces.

The retaking of Mukalla, Hadhramaut’s eastern port capital and the prize the STC had seized in December, was the operation’s central military fact. AFP, cited by Al Jazeera and France 24, reported that Saudi warplanes had carried out “intense” air raids on one of the group’s camps at Barshid, west of Mukalla, and that by Sunday Saudi-backed forces were consolidating positions in the city. An official with the Saudi-backed forces later told AFP that at least 14 of their fighters had been killed in fighting and more than 30 wounded during the offensive.

Casualties and the arms dispute

Casualty figures remained preliminary on 4 January. A military official from the STC told AFP that at least 80 STC fighters had been killed in fighting and strikes since Friday, with at least 152 wounded and 130 taken captive. Saudi-backed officials separately reported 14 of their own dead and more than 30 wounded. Both figures carry the caveats attached to early combat reporting: identities, affiliations and circumstances of death have not been independently verified, and the tolls were provided by officials on each side of a still-active campaign.

The immediate trigger for the Saudi intervention was a 30 December 2025 air raid by the Saudi-led coalition on two vessels docked at the port of Mukalla, which Riyadh said were carrying weapons and military vehicles that had arrived from Fujairah in the UAE. Saudi Arabia accused the UAE of sending the military equipment to the STC and said the UAE-backed force’s presence in provinces bordering the kingdom was “a red line” for Saudi national security. The UAE rejected the accusation, called the claims “allegations,” and subsequently announced the end of the remaining missions of what it described as a counterterrorism deployment. The recapture of Mukalla and al-Mahra is the Saudi-led response made operational.

Casualty limits and what remains unverified

Several elements of the weekend’s reporting were preliminary or one-sided on 4 January. The STC’s casualty figures were supplied by an STC official to AFP, and the Saudi-backed toll was supplied by an official on the other side; neither has been independently confirmed, and earlier AFP-cited STC tolls (for example, 20 dead at Al-Khashaa on Friday) were likely to be revised as reporting continued. The status of Mukalla’s port, of Aden International Airport (closed since Thursday according to Al Jazeera), and of flights to and from Socotra — all of which the US embassy in Yemen flagged — remained fluid.

The STC also announced the start of a two-year transitional period toward declaring an independent state and a forthcoming referendum on southern independence, framed as a response to the operation. The PLC’s response, the timing of any direct PLC–STC talks in Riyadh, and the question of whether the UAE would publicly acknowledge any reduction in its support for the STC had not yet been disclosed on the day. Local reporting noted at least 18 suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated detainees had escaped from a Mukalla detention centre during the chaos of the fighting — a separate security concern that emerged in France 24’s Sunday reporting and that the Yemeni government had not, by the editorial cutoff, formally addressed.

What the recapture changes

The 4 January reversal restores the internationally recognised Yemeni government’s physical control of the two largest governorates in south-eastern Yemen, including Mukalla’s port and al-Mahra’s border crossings with Saudi Arabia, but it does not end the broader southern dispute. A government official told Reuters on Sunday that Yemeni government forces would press on from Hadhramaut toward Aden, the STC’s stronghold and the interim seat of government, where tensions remained high. The Yemeni government on Saturday accused the STC of restricting civilian movement into Aden, calling the measures a breach of the Riyadh Agreement, and Saudi Arabia was hosting parallel talks in Riyadh that both sides had publicly welcomed.

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the recapture is the most visible result of the December rift between the two anti-Houthi coalition partners becoming a military contest. The Saudi position — that the UAE-backed STC’s presence in border provinces is incompatible with the kingdom’s security — has now been tested in combat, with the operation’s stated success on 4 January. Whether that success holds while talks proceed, and whether the PLC and the STC reach a political settlement in Riyadh, were the open questions on 4 January.

Sources & reporting notes

This article is an original synthesis of official statements and independent contemporaneous reporting, not eyewitness reporting. Casualty figures are early and one-sided; territorial control may continue to shift as the campaign develops.

  1. Al Jazeera — Saudi-backed government forces retake multiple cities in southern Yemen4 January 2026 · Primary statement from the PLC on the recapture of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra, district-by-district control, Mukalla’s status, and the PLC’s protest over movement restrictions in Aden.
  2. France 24 / AFP — Scores of Yemen’s separatists killed in clashes with Saudi-backed forces, official says4 January 2026 · Independent reporting on STC and Saudi-backed casualties, Barshid air strikes, Mukalla consolidation and the Mukalla detention-centre escape.
  3. Associated Press — What to know about the latest tensions in Yemen and the parties involved7 January 2026 · Independent background on the National Shield Forces’ retaking of areas seized by the STC and the wider Saudi–UAE dispute that produced the December rift.